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Educational homogamy is an important but poorly understood source of 
inequality. This paper analyzes a group of men and women who do not meet 
their spouses in school, are not sorted by education at work, and have no 
financial incentives to marry educated spouses. Nevertheless, movie actors show 
a strong tendency to sort positively on education in marriage. These findings 
suggest that male and female preferences alone induce considerable sorting on 
education in marriage and that men and women have very strong preferences for 
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Decades of research in the social sciences have documented that men and women tend to marry 
spouses with a level of education similar to their own. In a recent study, Fernández, Guner, and 
Knowles (2005) examine marital patterns in 34 countries and report that the average correlation for 
husband and wife years of education is as high as 0.6. In another study, Kremer (1997) examines 
US marriages in the recent past and finds a similar degree of sorting on education already in the 
1940 census. These results illustrate that sorting on education is, and has been, a key aspect of how 
marriage markets operate in a wide range of countries. 
Economists have devoted considerable attention to marital sorting on education because the 
tendency of men and women to marry partners similar to themselves has important implications for 
inequality. In a direct way, more sorting on education leads to more cross-sectional inequality as 
educated men and women earn higher wages and are wealthier (Becker and Murphy 2000). A recent 
line of research has also argued that men and women respond to more wage inequality by increasing 
the degree of sorting on education in marriage (Fernández et al. 2005).  Despite these important 
implications, however, social scientists know very little about why men and women sort on 
education in marriage.  
A first empirical challenge has been to determine the role played by search frictions in the marriage 
market. On the one hand, economists since Becker (1973) have emphasized theories of marriage in 
which men and women interact in a world without frictions. Sociologists and demographers, on the 
other hand, tend to stress the importance of segregation in school and the workplace, and argue that 
search frictions induce men and women to marry the spouses they are more likely to meet in the 
first place. An application of this theory can be found in the recent book by Blossfeld and Timm 
(2003), who claim that marital sorting on education has been rising in several European countries. 
The authors attribute this trend to the fact that men and women spend a larger fraction of their lives 
obtaining an education, and therefore are more likely to meet their spouses in school. 
A second empirical challenge has been to identify the preferences that men and women have for 
partner attributes. For example, are preferences for partner education monotonic in the sense that all 
men and women prefer the most highly educated members of the opposite sex, or do men and 
women want to marry partners with a level of education similar to their own? Is the high degree of 
marital sorting on education caused by the fact that men and women care about material resources 
and recognize that more educated partners have higher incomes and are wealthier? Or is marital 
sorting on education so strong because men and women seek partners who are similar to themselves 3 
 
in terms of their interests, ability, and desired lifestyle (traits that are arguably correlated with 
formal education)? 
To obtain new evidence on the causes of marital sorting on education, this paper performs a case 
study of successful movie actors who differ from the overall population in two important ways. 
First of all, this paper documents that movie actors do not meet their spouses in school, and are not 
sorted by education in their professional lives. Therefore, any potential marital sorting on education 
among movie actors cannot be attributed to segregation in school or at the workplace. Secondly, 
successful movie actors have no financial incentives to sort on education in marriage. This unusual 
situation is due to the fact that successful movie actors do not earn wages that are correlated with 
their formal education, and are so wealthy relative to their parents that they have no incentives to 
choose their spouses on the basis of expected parental bequests. 
Despite these two important differences between movie actors and the overall population, this paper 
shows that movie actors nevertheless marry partners with a level of education similar to their own. 
In particular, the correlation coefficient for husband and wife years of education in actor marriages 
is as high as 0.4 (as opposed to 0.6 in the overall US population, see Hitsch et al. 2010). This paper 
also documents that the marital sorting on education among successful movie actors is not induced 
by sorting on age, race, or physical appearance, and that movie actors divorce and remarry at a rate 
which is similar to that of the overall population. 
Since neither segregation nor financial incentives can explain marital sorting on education among 
movie actors, this paper explores a number of alternative explanations of this behavior. The only 
plausible explanation that is found to be consistent with the data is that movie actors sort on 
education in marriage because of the preferences that men and women have for partner attributes. 
The marriages of movie actors therefore highlight two important features of the marriage market 
that are useful for understanding marital sorting on education in the general population, and that 
have been difficult to isolate in other studies.  
The first of these features is that male and female preferences over partner attributes alone would 
generate considerable sorting on education in marriage. This result can be established without 
knowing if segregation contributes to educational homogamy in the overall US population. What it 
suggests, is that a substantial degree of educational homogamy would remain in the economy, if for 4 
 
example the tendency of men and women to work with colleagues of a similar educational 
background were to disappear.  
The second feature is that men and women have very strong preferences for nonfinancial partner 
traits correlated with education. This result can be established without knowing if income and 
wealth inequality contributes to educational homogamy in the overall US population. This result 
does not merely say that men and women have strong preferences for nonfinancial partner traits. 
What it says is that men and women have very strong preferences for nonfinancial partner traits 
correlated with education. What it suggests, is that a considerable degree of marital sorting on 
education would remain in the overall economy, even if public policies were to reduce the amount 
of income and wealth inequality. 
This paper is part of a recent literature in economics that is studying the causes of marital sorting 
using new and alternative identification strategies (other papers in this literature include Abramitzky 
et al. 2010, Banerjee et al. 2009, Lee 2009, and Nielsen and Svarer 2009). Two early examples from 
this literature are the papers by Fisman et al. (2006 and 2007) who performed a speed dating 
experiment on graduate students at Columbia University. The behavior of the students was then 
used to estimate male and female preferences over partner attributes. A main result from these 
revealing papers is that both men and women have strong preferences for partners of their own race 
(stronger than what they typically indicate in surveys). Another important result is that men place a 
greater weight on physical appearance than women do, when evaluating the relative importance of 
partner income and partner physical attractiveness.  
Two other early examples are the extensive and innovative papers by Hitsch et al. (2010 and 
forthcoming) which examine the behavior of US men and women on an online dating website. In a 
first step, the authors use data on browsing behavior and email exchanges to estimate male and 
female preferences over partner attributes. The authors find that both men and women have 
monotonic and increasing preferences for partner income, and that both men and women have 
strong preferences for partners with an education similar to their own. In a second step, the authors 
then use the estimated preferences to predict marital outcomes using the Gale and Shapley (1962) 
assignment model. These predicted matches exhibit sorting patterns similar to those observed in US 
marriages, although a little bit weaker. The authors therefore argue that partner preferences alone 
can generate a large fraction of the sorting patterns observed in actual marriages. 5 
 
This paper is most similar to the Hitsch et al. papers of online dating since it also deals with the 
underlying causes of educational homogamy. Because this study employs a different empirical 
strategy, studies a very different population, and still reaches the same broad conclusions, this study 
complements the Hitsch et al. papers, and reinforces their main results. One potential concern with 
studying online dating is that men and women may not behave in the same way as when they 
actually wish to get married. Another potential concern is that men and women behave strategically 
when they interact on a dating website. For example, a man with a low level of education may 
choose not to contact a highly educated woman, not because of his own preferences for partner 
education, but simply because he thinks he will be rejected by the woman. His behavior may then 
be interpreted by an econometrician as if he has preferences for women with a level of education 
similar to his own. The findings of this study eliminates many of these concerns because it deals 
with actual marriages as opposed to dating, and it does not proceed by estimating preferences over 
partner attributes by using observations on men and women who are engaged in potentially strategic 
dating behavior.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section two below describes the new data set that has 
been assembled for this study, and documents that movie actors have an educational background 
and marital habits that are similar to those of the general population. Section three presents the main 
results of this paper on marital sorting, and includes a very wide range of robustness checks that 
examine if the educational homogamy among movie actors is due to factors that are specific to this 
group of men and women. No evidence of such specific factors can be found in the data. Finally, 
section four concludes. 
I. Data 
A. Actors and Their Spouses 
To obtain a list of the top actors in the US movie industry, I used the 2006 Ulmer Scale which is a 
widely used ranking of movie actors compiled by James Ulmer and his associates
1.  Every couple of 
years, Ulmer’s company interviews several dozen professionals in the worldwide movie industry 
and asks them to rate the ability of actors to generate revenues for major movie productions (an 
ability referred to as the “bankability” of the actor). Based on these professional assessments, each 




his or her index score. In addition to selecting top actors, I also use the Ulmer bankability index as a 
proxy for actor earnings, since actors who generate large revenues for their employers will obtain 
high wages in a competitive labor market
2. 
The Ulmer Scale does not include information about the marital status of top actors. I therefore 
complemented the Ulmer Scale data with actor marital histories from the biographical encyclopedia 
“Marquis Who’s Who on the Web”
3. The encyclopedia contains information about the starting and 
ending year of actor marriages, and the names of all spouses. In order to facilitate comparisons 
between actors and the married men and women in the overall US population, I limited this study to 
actor marriages that were listed as ongoing in the Marquis encyclopedia.   
B. Actor Online Profiles 
For all actors and their spouses, I compiled information about their years of education from a 
number of online sources. For each individual, I read the information available at Wikipedia, Yahoo 
Movies, and the Internet Movie Data Base (IMDB)
 4 and recorded the highest formal degree 
awarded, the name of the granting institution, and any other relevant educational information. If no 
information was available or if the information was inconsistent, I also searched additional online 
sources and listed them in the data set. All of the educational information was then compiled into a 
single estimate of the actors’ and their spouses’ years of education (the principles guiding this 
compilation are listed in Appendix A)
 5. If the quality of the educational information was perceived 
to be rather poor, I also recorded this in the data set.  
In 2006, the Ulmer Scale ranked a total of more than 1300 actors, but as one progresses towards less 
and less famous actors, it becomes more and more difficult to find reliable information on the 
educational background of these actors and their spouses. I therefore limited this study to the top 
400 actors in 2006 and their spouses, which gave a total of 176 unique couples. Among these, I 
found no reliable data on the education of the spouse in 36 couples, and for 26 others, I had to 
impute spouse years of education from information on the occupation of the spouse (see Appendix 








couples for which educational information was available, and smaller restricted samples with 
education data of better quality.  
The online actor profiles also contain information about how the actors met their spouses. I 
summarized this data by dividing all couples into those that met in school, those that met at work 
(which includes actors meeting fellow actors, and actors meeting movie professionals such as 
cameraman or makeup artists), and those couples that met in any other way.    
C. Actor Colleagues 
Several data sources provide lists of the movies that individual actors have appeared in, and the 
names of all other actors who also appeared in those movies. To examine the degree of sorting on 
education among actors cast together in a movie, one could therefore collect data on all opposite sex 
colleagues of top actors in all the movies they ever appeared in. However, many actors have 
appeared in several dozen movies that in turn featured several dozen actors. This large amount of 
colleagues implies that it would take several years to collect such data for all the top 400 actors 
studied in this paper.  
To obtain a good measure of sorting in movies but also keep the required amount of data at a 
feasible level, I therefore used several restrictions when collecting data on actor colleagues. First of 
all, I only collected data on colleagues of currently married actors. Secondly, I only examined the 
colleagues of actors in their latest movie or television production according to the Internet Movie 
Database (IMDB). Finally, I only recorded the name of the highest listed opposite sex actor 
colleague at the IMDB. After having obtained the names of all these colleagues, I then collected 
educational information on them from several online sources, using the exact same procedure 
through which I collected educational information on the top 400 actors.   
D. Actor Physical Appearance 
Finally, I compiled an index of the physical attractiveness of husbands and wives in couples where 
top actors are married to other actors or spouses with similar occupations such as singers, models, 
and musicians
6. For that purpose, I asked seven male students to rate the physical appearance of the 






the men and women belong to the top, middle, or bottom third of the looks distribution. I then 
assigned these ratings the numerical values of 3, 2, and 1, and constructed an overall index of 
physical attractiveness by computing the mean across all seven individual ratings.  
E. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 below contains summary statistics for some of the most important traits of the top 400 male 
and female actors studied in this paper. The mean age for the male actors is 48 years, whereas the 
female actors are a little bit younger with a mean age of 41 years. Both male and female actors have 
slightly below 14 years of education on average. Of all male actors, 52 percent are currently married 
whereas the corresponding fraction for female actors is 38 percent. Finally, the mean age at 
marriage for currently married male actors is 38 years, and the mean age at marriage for currently 
married female actors is 35 years. 
In Table 2, I summarize the data on how actors meet their spouses. As can be seen in the table, most 
actors meet their spouses while working (47%), which includes cases where actors are cast against 
each other, but also cases where actors meet directors or other movie professionals such as 
cameramen and makeup artists. Only 7 % of all actors meet their spouses in school (defined in a 
very generous way so as to include many couples). Finally, 45% of all actors meet their spouses 
through other than work and school situations, which include actors who meet their spouses through 
friends and actors who meet their spouses at public events such as charity dinners. 
F. Marital Histories 
To compare the marital behavior of top actors and the overall US population, I use data from the 
2008 American Community Survey (ACS 2008) conducted by the US Census Bureau. The ACS 
2008 covered a one percent random sample of the US population and included detailed questions on 
the lifetime marital histories of all respondents. Based on their answers to those questions, the 
respondents were then classified into those who had never been married, those who had married 
once, those who had married twice, and those who had married three or more times.  
In Figure 1 below, I display the distribution over these four categories for the top 400 actors using 
the data obtained from Marquis’ biographical encyclopedia. As can be seen in the figure, most top 
male and female actors have never been married, or have only been married once in their lifetime (a 9 
 
total of 72 percent). Another 20 percent of the actors have been married twice, and only 8 percent 
have married three times or more.  
In Figure 1, I also display the distribution over these marital categories for the overall US 
population according to the ACS 2008. In this figure, all observations from the ACS 2008 have 
been weighted according to the age and gender distribution of the top actors, so as to make the 
comparison between the two populations more meaningful. As can be seen in the figure, the marital 
behavior of top actors and the overall population is similar. The biggest difference is that actors are 
more likely to never have been married and less likely to have been married once. In terms of the 
fraction who have married twice, or three times or more, the difference between the two populations 
is very small.  
G. Educational Distribution 
In Figure 2 below, I display the educational distribution of the top female actors who are divided 
into those with less than a high school degree, those with a high school degree, those with some 
college, those with a college degree, and those with more than a college degree. The distribution 
reveals that there is substantial variation in the educational level of top female actors. To make a 
comparison with the overall US female population, I also include the same distribution computed 
on female respondents in the ACS 2008 but with individual observations weighted by the age 
distribution of the female actors. As can be seen in the figure, these two distributions for female 
actors and the overall US female population are similar. 
In figure 3, I present the corresponding distributions for male actors and the overall US male 
population. The figure shows that there is also substantial variation in the educational level of top 
male actors. However, male actors are more educated than the overall male population, and a larger 
fraction of male actors has obtained a college degree. This difference between male and female 
actors is most likely due to a higher premium on youth for female actors, who respond to such 









A. Actor Bankability 
In Table 3 below, I present regressions of the Ulmer bankability index on actor years of education, 
race, a dummy that separates US and Canadian nationals from the rest, and a fourth order 
polynomial in actor age (henceforth “main demographic variables”). In all regressions, I only 
include actors who are 25 years or older since younger actors may not have completed their formal 
education. The first regression in column one is performed on the sample of all male actors, and 
produces a negative coefficient on years of education that is not significantly different from zero 
(only three age variables are significant in the regression). In terms of magnitudes, the association 
between formal education and bankability is weak, as a one standard deviation increase in years of 
education is associated with a less than one tenth of a standard deviation decrease in bankability.  
Since the market for actors is dominated by a few superstars who constitute a form of outliers, I 
proceed by excluding the top 15 male actors from the sample. The result from the regression using 
this modified sample is presented in column two. The coefficient on male years of education is now 
smaller in absolute magnitude and also less significant.  
In column three of Table 3, I present the results of the bankability regression performed on all 
female actors. The regression indicates that for this group of actors, there is again no significant 
relationship between formal years of education and bankability (only the age coefficients and one of 
the race coefficients are significant). In terms of magnitudes, the association between bankability 
and formal education for female actors is weak, as a one standard deviation increase in formal 
education is associated with a less than one twentieth of a standard deviation decrease in 
bankability. In column four of Table 3, I remove the top 15 female actors and receive a similar 
result (the coefficient on years of education is not significant, and is small in absolute magnitude). 
Finally, I restrict attention to the sample of male and female actors who are married to fellow actors 
or spouses with similar occupations (singers, models, or musicians), and for whom I have an 
assessment of their physical appearance. In the last column of Table 3, I perform the regression of 
the bankability index on actor education and the main demographic variables, and also add physical 
appearance among the controls. As can be seen in the table, the coefficient for physical appearance 
is positive and significant, but the years of education variable is still insignificant and very small in 
absolute magnitude.  11 
 
To summarize the findings for both male and female actors, there is no significant relationship 
between formal years of education and bankability among top actors. In terms of magnitudes, the 
estimated relationship between formal education and bankability is weak. The only variables that 
appear to be systematically and significantly related to actor bankability are age and physical 
appearance.  
B. Actor Colleagues 
To examine the degree of sorting among actors cast together in a movie, I compute a number of 
correlations for the education of the top actor and his or her opposite sex colleague which are 
displayed in Table 4. I start by using the sample of all actors and colleagues for which I have 
educational data and obtain a very small correlation of 0.034. I then compute the correlation using 
the smaller sample of actors and actor colleagues for which the educational data was perceived to be 
of good quality. The correlation for years of education is now 0.029. Finally, I compute the partial 
correlation for the education of the top actor and his or her colleague while controlling for the main 
demographic variables that were included in the bankability regressions. This partial correlation is 
negative and equal to -0.036. When I also include the bankability of the top actor among the 
controls, the partial correlation is equal to -0.037.  
To summarize these results, there appears to be not systematic sorting on education among actors 
who are cast together in a movie or a television production, since all the computed correlations in 
Table 4 are very small and insignificant. When the main demographic variables are included among 
the controls, the partial correlation for male and female education is even slightly negative.  
C. Actor Marriages 
After having established that the formal education of actors is not correlated with actor bankability, 
and that actors are not segregated by education in their professional lives, I turn to the results 
concerning the sorting on education in actor marriages. All of these results are presented in Table 5. 
First of all, I use the full sample of all 140 couples for which I have educational data and compute 
the  correlation for husband and wife years of education which is equal to 0.31. To deal with the 
problem of measurement error, I then use the sample of couples for which I did not have to impute 
spouse years of education from occupational data, and obtain a correlation of 0.35. Finally, I use the 
sample of couples for which no imputations were made and for which the data on husband and wife 12 
 
education was classified as being of good quality. In this sample, the correlation for husband and 
wife years of education is equal to 0.39. 
The overall pattern that emerges from these correlations is that there is substantial sorting on 
education in actor marriages. Furthermore, as the correlation for husband and wife years of 
education grows as better and better data is used, it appears as if the data on actor education is 
contaminated by measurement error which induces a downward bias in the correlation. When I use 
the sample with data of the highest quality, the correlation for husband and wife years of education 
is in the order of 0.4. 
To examine how sensitive these results are, I also compute the partial correlation for husband and 
wife years of education while controlling for the main demographic variables that were included in 
the bankability regressions. With these controls, the partial correlation for husband and wife years 
of education is equal to 0.40. When I also control for the bankability index of the top actor, the 
partial correlation is equal to 0.37. Given these high correlations, it is clear that the observed sorting 
on education among actors is not induced by sorting on main demographic variables such as age or 
race, or sorting on actor bankability. 
 
Finally, I construct a scatter plot over husband and wife residualized years of education to verify 
that the high correlation for education in actor marriages is not driven by a small number of outliers. 
As can be seen in Figure 4, the relationship between husband and wife education is approximately 
linear, and there are no visual signs of extreme outliers.   
D. Robustness Checks: Age at Marriage 
My interpretation of the observed marital sorting behavior of top actors is that men and women 
have strong preferences for partners who are similar to themselves in terms of nonfinancial traits 
correlated with formal education. In this and the following sections, I perform a number of 
robustness checks to evaluate alternative interpretations. 
A first alternative explanation is that some actors marry early in life prior to their professional 
breakthroughs, and then remain married to the same partner for the rest of their life. Furthermore, 
these early marriages are responsible for all the correlation between husband and wife years of 
education in actor marriages. To deal with this potential problem, I limit the sample of actors to 
those who married above a certain age. First, I only include actors who married after age 25 and 13 
 
obtain a partial coefficient for husband and wife years of education of 0.42. Then, I only include 
actors who married after age 30 and obtain a partial correlation of 0.37. Finally, I restrict myself to 
actors who married after age 35 and obtain a partial correlation for husband and wife years of 
education of 0.46. All these robustness checks indicate that actors who marry later in life when they 
have arguably had their professional breakthroughs, also display a strong tendency to sort on 
education in marriage.  
E. Robustness Checks: Alternative Numbers of Actors 
Due to the problem of collecting data on the less famous actors and their spouses, this study has 
been restricted to the top 400 male and female actors in the US movie industry. Since this particular 
cutoff point is somewhat arbitrary, I examine the degree of marital sorting on education in two other 
samples of actors as defined by alternative cutoffs. When only the top 300 male and female actors 
are included in the sample, the partial correlation for husband and wife years of education is equal 
to 0.37. When only the top 200 couples are included, the partial correlation is equal to 0.47. More 
alternative cutoffs could be chosen but the result is likely to be the same, namely that the high 
degree of sorting on education in actor marriages is not only present in the sample of the top 400 
actors that was chosen as the basis for this study. 
F. Robustness Checks: Actor Public Image 
Since top male and female actors are public figures whose private lives are often exposed to the 
overall population, it is conceivable that actors in part choose their partners to create an image that 
promotes their personal careers. For example, one could speculate that educated actors tend to play 
educated characters on the screen, and therefore choose to marry educated partners to reinforce their 
actor image. This interpretation requires that members of the overall population know who top 
actors are married to, and that they know the formal education of these spouses.   
To examine this potential explanation of the documented marital sorting pattern among actors, I 
study the group of actors who choose not to marry a partner who is a fellow actor, or a spouse with 
a similar occupation such as a singer, model, or a musician. When I restrict myself to this group of 
actors, I find that the partial correlation for husband and wife years of education is equal to 0.35. 
Such a high correlation suggests that concerns for a public image do not induce marital sorting on 
education among movie actors, because the same degree of sorting is found also among actors who 
marry spouses that are unknown to the public. 14 
 
G. Robustness Checks: Preferences for Education 
The sorting on education among actors who do not marry fellow actors or spouses with similar 
occupations also provides evidence on the preferences that men and women have for partner 
education. Successful movie actors are very wealthy and almost always very attractive which 
implies that they have a close to unlimited choice of partners when they marry someone outside of 
their own profession. Such a conclusion is supported by the evidence in Hitsch et al. (2010) which 
shows that that both men and women have increasing and monotonic preferences for partner income 
and physical appearance.  
Consider for example, a very wealthy and attractive male actor with a high school degree who does 
not marry a fellow actor or a spouse with a similar occupation. Arguably, he has the option to marry 
women with a high school degree, but also women with a college degree. The fact that male and 
female actors in that situation choose to marry spouses who have a level of education similar to 
their own, is strong evidence in favor of preferences for partner education that are not monotonic.  
H. Robustness Checks: Physical Appearance 
Another potential explanation is that much of the observed marital sorting among actors is caused 
by sorting on physical appearance. For example, one can imagine that actors need to be either very 
attractive or have a long education to become successful in the movie industry. If actors do sort on 
physical appearance in marriage, then attractive and less educated actors will end up marrying other 
attractive and less educated actors, and vice versa.  
To examine this potential explanation for marital sorting on education among actors, I compute the 
partial correlation of husband and wife years of education in the couples for which I have data on 
husband and wife physical appearance. This correlation is equal to 0.32. When I include the 
physical attractiveness of the husband and the wife among the controls, I obtain a partial correlation 
of 0.31. This small difference between the two partial correlations suggests that sorting on physical 
appearance is not the underlying cause of the observed marital sorting on education among actors.  
I. Robustness Checks: Meeting Places 
The fact that actors very rarely meet their spouses while in school and are not cast together with 
colleagues who have a similar education as themselves, suggests that segregation in school or the 
workplace is not the underlying cause of marital sorting on education among actors. To provide 15 
 
additional evidence concerning the role of segregation in actor marriages, I analyze the actors who 
did not meet their partners in school or at work, and obtain a partial correlation for husband and 
wife years of education of 0.53. This high correlation confirms the conclusion drawn above, namely 
that segregation in school or the workplace is not responsible for the high correlation of husband 
and wife education in actor marriages. 
J. Robustness Checks: Prestige 
Although more educated actors do not earn higher wages, once could speculate that they are more 
skilled actors, and therefore enjoy more prestige in the movie industry. If male and female actors 
sort positively on professional prestige in marriage, then the observed sorting on education could 
simply be a byproduct of this underlying behavior. To investigate this hypothesis, I collected data 
on the actors who have won an Academy Award (popularly known as an “Oscar”) for acting, 
arguably the most prestigious acting award in the movie industry. I then estimate a probit model for 
the probability that an individual actor has won an Oscar, as a function of his or her years of 
education and the main demographic variables. As can be seen in Table 6 below, actor years of 
education does not have any significant impact on the probability of winning an Oscar, in fact, some 
of the coefficients for years of education are even negative. These results do not provide any 
support for the hypothesis that educated actors enjoy more prestige in the movie industry, and marry 
other educated actors because they also enjoy more prestige. 
III. Conclusion 
Social scientists have documented that men and women tend to marry spouses with a level of 
education similar to their own. Such positive marital sorting on education has important 
implications for inequality, but the causes of this behavior are not well understood. A first empirical 
challenge is to evaluate the role that search frictions play in generating marital sorting on education, 
and a second empirical challenge is to identify the preferences that men and women have over 
partner attributes. 
This paper examined the marital behavior of successful actors in the US movie industry, a group of 
men and women which provides valuable evidence on the causes of marital sorting because of the 
two ways in which they differ from the overall population. First of all, movie actors do not meet 
their spouses in school and are not segregated by education in their professional lives. Therefore, 
segregation in school and at the workplace does not induce marital sorting on education among 16 
 
movie actors. Secondly, successful movie actors have no financial incentives to marry educated 
spouses, as they earn wages that are not correlated with their formal education and are much 
wealthier than their parents.   
Despite these two differences with the overall population, this paper documented that movie actors 
marry partners with a level of education similar to their own. This behavior is not induced by 
sorting on age, race, or physical appearance, and does not appear to be caused by career concerns 
among actors. The tendency of movie actors to sort on education in marriage, therefore reveals 
important features of the marriage market that are useful for understanding marital sorting on 
education in the general population. 
The first of these features is that male and female preferences over partners alone would generate 
considerable sorting on education in marriage. What it suggests, is that a substantial degree of 
educational homogamy would remain in the economy even if for example the tendency of men and 
women to work with colleagues of a similar educational background were to disappear. The second 
feature is that men and women have very strong preferences for nonfinancial partner traits 
correlated with education. What it suggests, is that a considerable degree of marital sorting on 
education would remain in the economy, even if public policies were to reduce the amount of 





APPENDIX A – A MEASURE OF YEARS OF EDUCATION  
 
The following principles were used when a measure of years of education was constructed for 
actors and their spouses from several different biographical sources: 
1) All years of education measures were based on the highest formal degree obtained by men and 
women, not the number of years it took them to obtain that degree. For example, men and women 
with a US high school degree were assigned 12 years of education, and men and women with a US 
college degree were assigned 16 years of education. 
2) Men and women who terminated their formal education prior to graduation, were assigned a 
years of education measure based upon the highest formal degree they were pursuing, minus the 
time they had left before graduation. For example, a man or woman who dropped out of a US high 
school after completing his or her junior year was assigned 11 years of education. A man or woman 
who completed two years in college and then dropped out, was assigned 14 years of education. 
3) Men and women who dropped out of school in a given grade were assumed to have completed 
half of the school year (if no further information was provided). For example, a man or woman who 
dropped out of a US high school in his or her first year of studies was assigned 9.5 years of 
education. 
4) Men and women who dropped out of school at a given age were assumed to have completed half 
of the school year (if no further information was provided). For example, a man or woman who 
dropped out of a US high school at age 16 was assigned 10.5 years of education. 
5) The only types of educational institutions which were included in the years of education measure 
were primary and secondary schools, and institutions of higher education which granted academic 
degrees (e.g. bachelor’s or master’s degrees). Pure professional schools that had no academic 
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               TABLE 1 -  SUMMARY STATISTICS 
   Men  Women 
Mean Age   47.9  41.3 
Mean Years of Education  13.8  13.5 
Fraction Married  0.52  0.38 
Mean Age at Current Marriage  37.5  34.7 
Notes: Summary statistics for the top 400 actors in the US 
movie industry according to the 2006 Ulmer Scale (250 






TABLE 2 – PLACES WHERE  
ACTORS MEET THEIR SPOUSES 





Notes: Main ways in which top 400 actors in 
the  US movie industry meet their spouses. 
Category “Other” includes actors who meet 
their spouses through friends, at public 
social events, etc. 
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                                       TABLE 3 – BANKABILITY REGRESSIONS 
      All     Not Top     All     Not Top      Married to 
      Men     15 Men     Women     15 Women         Actors 
Years of Education  -2.203  -0.376  -0.652  0.880  -1.785 
(1.497) (1.342)  (1.587)  (1.14)  (2.401) 
Asian 3.885  17.263  -10.27  2.177  -6.669 
(22.43) (19.55)  (24.27)  (16.81)  (13.62) 
Black -7.620  -0.611  -2.586  -4.883  -17.68 
(10.82) (9.579)  (14.97)  (11.1)  (38.70) 
Hispanic 9.466  17.647  54.51**  67.84***  6.702 
(19.79) (17.16)  (21.03)  (16.81)  (16.88) 
US/Canadian 0.703  -3.330  8.024  11.07*  39.21 
(7.777) (6.893)  (7.911)  (5.843)  (37.20) 
Physical Appearance  -  -  -  -  26.37** 
(11.55) 
Age 73.91*  60.40*  80.11**  36.66  43.46 
(41.10) (36.15)  (40.41)  (29.71)  (70.08) 
Age2  ‐2.206*  -1.887* -2.531** -1.231  -1.324 
(1.263) (1.113)  (1.270)  (0.929)  (2.151) 
Age3 0.028*  0.025*  0.033*  0.0174  0.0176 
(0.017) (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.0283) 
Age4 -1.3E-04  -1.191E-04*  -1.602E-04*  -8.82E-05 -8.56E-05 
(7.97E-04) (7.03E-04)  (8.23E-05)  (5.96E-05)  (1.349E-04 
Constant -680.537  -511.961  -722.9  -253.7  -372.7 
(484.6) (425.5)  (465.8)  (343.6)  832.0 
# Observations     247     232     135     120     93 
R-Squared 0.029  0.025  0.163  0.179  0.116 
                                
Notes: Each column refers to a separate regression. Dependent variable in all regressions is actor 
bankability index according to the 2006 Ulmer Scale. Unit of observation is individual actor age 25 years or 
older. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Samples in each respective column are: all male actors, 
all male actors minus the top 15, all female actors, all female actors minus the top 15, and all male and 
female actors married to actors and spouses with similar occupations (singers, models, or musicians).  








TABLE 4 – SORTING AMONG ACTORS CAST 
TOGETHER IN A MOVIE OR TELEVISION PRODUCTION 
Sample Controls Correlation  #  Obs. 
C1 None  0.034  168 
C2 None  0.029  138 
C2 Race,  Nationality, -0.036  138 
Age coefficients 
C2 Race,  Nationality, -0.037  138 
Age coefficients, 
Bankability 
Notes: Raw and partial correlations for the education of male and female actors cast together 
in a movie or television production. Pair of opposite sex actors in each movie or television 
production consists of a married top actor and the highest listed opposite sex actor in the last 
movie or television production which the top actor appeared in (according to the IMDB). 
The table also includes controls in partial correlations, and the number of observations. The 
samples are: C1 – top 400 male and female actors in the US movie industry who are married, 
C2 – all actors and actor colleagues from C1, except those for which the educational data on 









TABLE 5 – CORRELATION FOR HUSBAND AND WIFE                  
YEARS OF EDUCATION IN ACTOR MARRIAGES 
Sample  Controls  Correlation  # Obs.  95% C.I. 
M1 None  0.31  140  (0.15,0.45) 
M2 None  0.37  114  (0.20,0.52) 
M3 None  0.39  98  (0.21,0.55) 
M3 Race,  Nationality,  0.40  98  (0.22,0.56) 
Age coefficients 
M3 Race,  Nationality,  0.37  98  (0.17,0.53) 
Age coefficients, 
Bankability 
M3 minus   Race, Nationality,  0.42  93  (0.23,0.58) 
married after 25  Age coefficients 
M3 minus   Race, Nationality,  0.37  73  (0.14,0.56) 
married after 30  Age coefficients 
M3 minus   Race, Nationality,  0.46  44  (0.16,0.68) 
married after 35  Age coefficients 
M3 minus top   Race, Nationality,  0.37  79  (0.16,0.56) 
301-400 actors  Age coefficients 
M3 minus top  Race, Nationality,  0.47  62  (0.23,0.65) 
201-400 actors  Age coefficients 
M4 Race,  Nationality,  0.32  53  (0.03,0.56) 
Age coefficients 
M4 Race,  Nationality,  0.31  53  (0.02,0.56) 
Age coefficients, 
Physical Appearance 
M5 Race,  Nationality,  0.35  45  (0.03,0.60) 
Age coefficients 
M3 minus met  Race, Nationality,  0.53  45  (0.25,0.73) 
in school or at work  Age coefficients 
              
Notes: Raw and partial correlations for husband and wife years of education, number of  
observations, and 95% confidence interval for correlations. The respective samples are: 
M1 - all couples,  M2 - all couples minus those for which spouse education was imputed based 
on occupation, M3 - all couples minus those with imputations and observations of poor quality, 
M4 - M3 minus actors married to other than fellow actors and entertainers, M5 - M3 minus 
actors married to fellow actors and entertainers. 24 
 
 
              TABLE 6 - PROBIT FOR WINNING ACADEMY AWARD 
      All     All Male     All Female  
      Actors     Actors     Actors 
Years of Education  -0.0122  -0.0257  0.00674 
(0.0346) (0.047)  (0.0532) 
Male -0.677***  -  - 
(0.161) 
Black 0.259  0.469  -0.253 
(0.269) (0.320)  (0.524) 
Hispanic 0.453  0.812  -0.204 
(0.430) (0.531)  (0.705) 
US/Canadian -0.128  -0.0100  -0.0680 
(0.175) (0.240)  (0.272) 
Age 1.631*  -0.0700  4.556** 
(0.980) (1.356)  1.894 
Age2 -0.050*  0.00261  -0.143** 
(0.030) (0.0405)  0.0589 
Age3 6.59E-04*  -2.840E-05  0.00191** 
(3.88E-04) (5.23E-04)  (7.89E-04) 
Age4 -3.14E-06*  1.14E-07  -9.26E-06** 
(1.84E-06) (2.45E-06)  (3.83E-06) 
Constant -20.06*  -0.840  -53.38** 
(11.72) (16.24)  (22.17) 
                    
# Observations  373  241  132 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.109  0.098  0.114 
                    
Notes: Each column refers to a different probit. Dependent variable in all probits is  
a dummy indicating whether an actor has ever been awarded an Academy Award  
(popularly known as an "Oscar") for acting. Unit of observation is individual  
actor age 25 or older. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Significance  







FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF MARRIAGES IN OVERALL  
US POPULATION AND AMONG TOP ACTORS IN THE US MOVIE INDUSTRY 
 
Notes: Data for the overall population is from the 2008 American Community Survey (ACS 2008) administered by 
the US Census Bureau. The data for actors is from the biographical encyclopedia “Marquis’ Who’s Who on the 
Web”. All men and women in the ACS 2008 were classified as never having married, having married once, having 
married twice, or having married three or more times (the categories along the horizontal axis of the figure). The 
distribution for male and female actors displays raw data. The distribution for the overall US population was 
constructed by weighting individual observations in the ACS 2008, according to the age and gender distribution of 


















FIGURE 2. EDUCATIONAL DISTRIBUTION FOR US FEMALE POPULATION 
AND TOP FEMALE ACTORS IN THE US MOVIE INDUSTRY 
 
Notes: Data for the overall population is from the 2008 American Community Survey (ACS 2008) administered by 
the US Census Bureau. The data for female actors is from several online sources, including Wikipedia, Yahoo 
Movies, and the Internet Movie Database (IMDB). The distribution for female actors displays raw data. The 
distribution for the overall US female population was constructed by weighting individual observations in the ACS 


























FIGURE 3. EDUCATIONAL DISTRIBUTION FOR US MALE POPULATION  
AND TOP MALE ACTORS IN THE US MOVIE INDUSTRY 
 
Notes: The data for the overall population is from the 2008 American Community Survey (ACS 2008) administered 
by the US Census Bureau. The data for male actors is from several online sources, including Wikipedia, Yahoo 
Movies, and the Internet Movie Database (IMDB). The distribution for male actors displays raw data. The 
distribution for the overall US male population was constructed by weighting individual observations in the ACS 
2008 according to the age distribution of the top male actors. 
 
























FIGURE 4. SCATTER PLOT FOR HUSBAND AND WIFE YEARS OF EDUCATION  
 
Notes: Partial correlation for husband and wife years of education (residualized) when race, nationality, and 








































WP  09-1 Tomi Kyyrä, Pierpaolo Parrotta and Michael Rosholm:   
The Effect of Receiving Supplementary UI 
Beneﬁts on Unemployment Duration 
ISBN  9788778824035 (print); ISBN  9788778824042 (online) 
 
WP 09-2  Dario Pozzoli and Marco Ranzani: Old  European  Couples’ 
Retirement Decisions: the Role of Love and Money 
ISBN  9788778824165 (print); ISBN  9788778824172 (online) 
 
WP  09-3 Michael Gibbs, Mikel Tapia and Frederic Warzynski: 
Globalization, Superstars, and the Importance of Reputation: 
Theory & Evidence from the Wine Industry 
  ISBN  9788778824189 (print); ISBN  9788778824196 (online) 
 
WP  09-4  Jan De Loecker and Frederic Warzynski: Markups and Firm-
Level Export Status  
  ISBN  9788778824202 (print); ISBN  9788778824219 (online) 
 
WP  09-5  Tor Eriksson, Mariola Pytliková and Frédéric Warzynski: 
Increased Sorting and Wage Inequality in the Czech Republic: 
New Evidence Using Linked Employer-Employee Dataset 
  ISBN  9788778824226 (print); ISBN  9788778824233 (online) 
 
WP  09-6  Longhwa Chen and Tor Eriksson: Vacancy Duration, Wage 
Offers, and Job Requirements – Pre-Match Data Evidence  
  ISBN  9788778824240 (print); ISBN  9788778824257 (online) 
 
WP  09-7  Tor Eriksson, Valérie Smeets and Frédéric Warzynski: Small 
Open Economy Firms  in International Trade: Evidence 
from Danish Transactions-Level Data 
  ISBN  9788778823861 (print); ISBN  9788778823878 (online) 
 
WP  09-8  Dario Pozzoli and Marco Ranzani: Participation and Sector 
Selection in Nicaragua 
  ISBN  9788778823885 (print); ISBN  9788778823892 (online) 
 WP 09-9  Rikke Ibsen, Frederic Warzynski and Niels Westergård-Nielsen: 
Employment Growth and International Trade: A Small Open 
Economy Perspective 
  ISBN  9788778823908 (print); ISBN  9788778823915 (online) 
  
WP 09-10 Roger Bandick and Holger Görg: Foreign acquisition, plant  
    survival, and employment growth 
  ISBN  9788778823922 (print); ISBN  9788778823939 (online) 
 
WP 09-11 Pierpaolo Parrotta and Dario Pozzoli:   The Effect of Learning by  
    Hiring on Productivity 
  ISBN  9788778823946 (print); ISBN  9788778823953 (online) 
 
WP 09-12 Takao Kato and Pian Shu 
  Peer Effects, Social Networks, and Intergroup  
  Competition in the Workplace 
    ISBN  9788778823984 (print); ISBN  9788778823991 (online) 
 
WP 09-13 Sanne Hiller and Erdal Yalcin:   Switching between Domestic  
    Market Activity, Export and FDI 
    ISBN  9788778824004 (print); ISBN  9788778824028 (online) 
 
WP 09-14 Tor Eriksson and Mariola Pytlikova: Foreign Ownership Wage  
   Premia in Emerging Economies: Evidence from Czech Republic 
    ISBN  9788778824035 (print); ISBN  9788778824042 (online) 
 
WP 09-15 Astrid Würtz Rasmussen: Family Structure Changes and  
   Children´s Health, Behavior, and Educational Outcomes 
    ISBN  9788778824059 (print); ISBN  9788778824066 (online) 
 
WP 09-16 Tor Eriksson: How Many Danish Jobs Can (Potentially) Be 
 Done  Elsewhere? 
   ISBN  9788778824073 (print); ISBN  9788778824080 (online) 
 
WP 09-17 Lorenzo Cappellari, Claudio Lucifora and Dario Pozzoli:  
   Determinants of Grades in Maths for Students in Economics 
   ISBN  9788778824103 (print); ISBN  9788778824110 (online) 
 
WP 09-18 Yingqiang Zhang and Tor Eriksson: Inequality of Opportunity  
  and Income Inequality in Nine   Chinese Provinces, 1989-2006 
   ISBN  9788778824127 (print); ISBN  9788778824134 (online) 
 
 
 WP 09-19 Ricard Gil and Frederic Warzynski: Vertical Integration,  
   Exclusivity and Game Sales Performance in the U.S. Video  
   Game Industry 
   ISBN  9788778824141 (print); ISBN  9788778824165 (online) 
 
WP 09-20 Christian Gormsen: Intransparent Markets and Intra-Industry  
   Trade 
   ISBN  9788778824172 (print); ISBN  9788778824189 (online) 
 
WP 09-21 Jan Bentzen and Valdemar Smith: Wine production in Denmark 
   Do the characteristics of the vineyards affect the chances for  
 awards? 
   ISBN  9788778824196 (print); ISBN  9788778824202 (online) 
 
WP 09-22 Astrid Würtz Rasmussen: Allocation of Parental Time and the  
   Long-Term Effect on Children´s Education 





WP 10-01 Marianne Simonsen, Lars Skipper and Niels Skipper:  
   Price Sensitivity of Demand for Prescription Drugs: Exploiting a  
   Regression Kink Design 
   ISBN  9788778824257 (print); ISBN  9788778824264 (online) 
  
WP 10-02 Olivier Gergaud, Valérie Smeets and Frédéric Warzynski: 
   Stars War in French Gastronomy: Prestige of Restaurants and  
   Chefs’Careers 
   ISBN  9788778824271 (print); ISBN  9788778824288 (online) 
 
WP 10-03 Nabanita Datta Gupta, Mette Deding and Mette Lausten: 
   Medium-term consequences of low birth weight on health and  
   behavioral deficits – is there a catch-up effect? 
   ISBN  9788778824301 (print); ISBN  9788778824318 (online) 
 
WP 10-04 Jørgen Drud Hansen, Hassan Molana, Catia Montagna and  
   Jørgen Ulff-Møller Nielsen: Work Hours, Social Value of  
   Leisure and Globalisation 
   ISBN  9788778824332 (print); ISBN  9788778824349 (online) 
 
WP 10-05 Miriam Wüst:   The effect of cigarette and alcohol consumption  
   on birth outcomes 
   ISBN  9788778824455 (print); ISBN  9788778824479 (online) WP 10-06 Elke J. Jahn and Michael Rosholm:Looking Beyond the Bridge:  
   How Temporary Agency Employ-ment Affects Labor Market  
   Outcomes   
  ISBN  9788778824486 (print); ISBN  9788778824493 (online) 
 
WP 10-07 Sanne Hiller and Robinson Kruse: Milestones of European  
   Integration: Which matters most for Export Openness? 
  ISBN  9788778824509 (print); ISBN  9788778824516 (online) 
 
WP 10-08 Tor Eriksson and Marie Claire Villeval: Respect as an Incentive 
   ISBN  9788778824523 (print); ISBN  9788778824530 (online) 
 
WP 10-09 Jan Bentzen and Valdemar Smith: Alcohol consumption and 
  liver cirrhosis mortality: New evidence from a panel data 
  analysis for sixteen European countries 
   ISBN  9788778824547 (print); ISBN  9788778824554 (online) 
 
WP 10-10 Ramana Nanda: Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of  
 External  Finance
 
  ISBN  9788778824561 (print); ISBN  9788778824578 (online) 
 
WP 10-11 Roger Bandick, Holger Görg and Patrik Karpaty: Foreign
  acquisitions, domestic multinationals, and R&D 
   ISBN 9788778824585 (print); ISBN 9788778824592 (online) 
 
WP 10-12 Pierpaolo Parrotta, Dario Pozzoli and Mariola Pytlikova: Does  
   Labor Diversity Affect Firm Productivity?  
   ISBN  9788778824608 (print); ISBN  9788778824615 (online) 
 
WP 10-13 Valérie Smeets and Frédéric Warzynski: Learning by Exporting,  
   Importing or Both? Estimating productivity with multi-product  
   firms, pricing heterogeneity and the role of international trade 
   ISBN  9788778824622 (print); ISBN  9788778824646 (online) 
 
WP 10-14 Tor Eriksson and Yingqiang Zhang: The Role of Family  
   Background for Earnings in Rural China 
   ISBN  9788778824653 (print); ISBN  9788778824660 (online) 
 
WP 10-15 Pierpaolo Parrotta, Dario Pozzoli and Mariola Pytlikova: The  
   Nexus between Labor Diversity and Firm´s Innovation  
   ISBN  9788778824875 (print); ISBN  9788778824882 (online) 
 
 
 WP 10-16 Tor Eriksson and Nicolai Kristensen: Wages or Fringes?  
   Some Evidence on Trade-offs and Sorting  
   ISBN  9788778824899 (print); ISBN  9788778824905 (online) 
 
WP 10-17 Gustaf Bruze: Male and Female Marriage Returns to Schooling  
   ISBN  9788778824912 (print); ISBN  9788778824929 (online) 
 
WP 10-18 Gustaf Bruze: New Evidence on the Causes of Educational  
   Homogamy 
   ISBN  9788778824950 (print); ISBN  9788778824967 (online) 
 
 
 
 
 